![]() This approach would involve providing international capital assistance to bridge India’s financing gaps in domestic subsidisation, ensuring affordable prices for both its poorer and middle class populations. A multilateral approach could be a potential ‘middle way’ to curb the escalation of an international food price crisis. Rather than pressuring India into normalising its rice trade, a more effective approach would be to address the ‘double burden’ that lies at the core of its export restrictions. India’s food price inflation continued to increase by 11.5 per cent in July 2023, causing the government to enact the recent rice export restrictions. This cycle led to a fast rise in domestic food prices in mid-2022 and the need for a minimum rice export price restriction by September 2022. As wheat and rice are substitutes in India’s grain stockpiles, wheat shortages feed into the rice shortage. India’s recent rice export bans can be better understood as an extension of the problems faced by its wheat sector. The program had previously allocated additional grains for public distribution to poorer consumers, but the government decided to reallocate these grains to domestic markets to quell inflation and appease the urban middle class. But increased wheat exports led to domestic shortages and a surge in domestic and international wheat prices, culminating in India’s wheat export ban in May 2022, which continues into 2023.Īpart from banning wheat exports, India also rolled back its massive COVID-19 food distribution program, Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana, on 1 January 2023. India increased wheat exports to over 1.4 million tonnes in April 2022 - roughly five times the exports from April 2021. The difficulty of this dual mandate can be gleaned after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when India stepped up to fill the gap in international wheat exports created by the conflict. Food exporting states hold a dual mandate of serving as a reliable supplier in the international food market while also meeting the food security needs of their own populace. In any case, a more constructive approach to engaging India - and food exporting states more broadly - should begin by acknowledging the complex balancing act they undertake within the global food order. As a potential prompt for yet more countries to join the bandwagon, Myanmar has also banned rice exports since August 2023.Ī small concession came in late August 2023 when the Indian government announced it would allow for exports to countries facing significant food security challenges such as Bhutan, Mauritius and Singapore, though this has done little to calm international markets. Rice prices have since spiralled to levels similar to the 2007–08 global food price crisis. In 2023, New Delhi imposed further constraints on parboiled rice, which accounts for 42 per cent of India’s milled rice exports. The Indian government has not yet normalised its rice trade, with the situation worsening by the month. Ahead of the March 2024 elections, there is a need to appease India’s urban middle class by reducing mounting food prices. India’s export bans can also be seen as irresponsible if driven not primarily by domestic food security, but rather by political reasons. Critics have further argued that the move by India, as the world’s largest rice exporter, could damage its claim to lead the Global South, falling far from its promises to address global food challenges under its 2023 G20 presidency. ![]() Much criticism has been levelled against India’s July 2023 decision to ‘ ban’ non-basmati rice exports, which previously made up a third of its milled rice exports. Economics, Politics and Public Policy in East Asia and the Pacific
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